Analyzing Google’s Use of Lobbying in their 2012 Federal Trade Commission Investigation

Authors

  • Camila Alatorre Seven Lakes High School
  • Hülya Eraslan Mentor, Seven Lakes High School

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47611/jsrhs.v10i4.2045

Keywords:

Lobbying, Google, FTC, Big Tech Regulation

Abstract

This paper explores Google’s lobbying efforts regarding their 2012 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation in order to determine whether the FTC investigation influenced Google’s use of direct lobbying. To do so, Google’s total lobbying expenditures and number of hired lobbyists one year before, during, and one year after the FTC investigation were examined. Through the use of the percent change formula, a quantification of the percent change in Google’s lobbying efforts in these different time periods delineate if the FTC investigation played a role in Google’s use of direct lobbying during this period. The result was that there was a “peak” of lobbying expenditures and hired lobbyists during the FTC investigation. There was a 292.029% increase in lobbying expenditures and a 105.263% increase in hired lobbyists from the year before the FTC investigation to the middle of the investigation. Furthermore, there was a 29.39% decrease in lobbying expenditures and a 17.094% decrease in hired lobbyists from the middle of the FTC investigation to one year after the investigation had concluded. This illustrates that Google increased their lobbying efforts during the FTC investigation and decreased their lobbying once the FTC investigation ended. This has several key implications in facilitating the understanding of the motivations of lobbying and a corporation’s potential reaction when faced with a federal antitrust investigation. Therefore, it can be concluded that when corporations are under regulatory concerns, they may turn towards direct lobbying efforts to provide a sense of security and influence during a time of uncertainty.

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Published

11-30-2021

How to Cite

Alatorre, C., & Eraslan, H. (2021). Analyzing Google’s Use of Lobbying in their 2012 Federal Trade Commission Investigation. Journal of Student Research, 10(4). https://doi.org/10.47611/jsrhs.v10i4.2045

Issue

Section

AP Capstone™ Research