Understanding the Role of Leverage in the Outcome of A Nuclear Weapons Program

Abstract

Why were some countries able to succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons while others didn’t when facing international pressure to stop the development of their nuclear program? I hypothesized that the level of leverage placed over the country trying to acquire nuclear weapons by its main ally and adversary is a key variable affecting the outcome of that country’s nuclear program. To test my hypothesis, I first described the different categories of leverage and I then compared the nuclear programs of North Korea and Taiwan using existing historical research and case studies. I compared the two countries to see if the categories of leverage were in fact different for the two countries. The two countries were chosen since they had different results (Taiwan failed, while the DPRK succeeded) and both had an ally and adversary that had some leverage over it. If leverage was different for the two countries it would be highly likely that leverage had a role in causing the different outcome, thus supporting my hypothesis.  If leverage was the same for the two countries, it would mean that leverage was not a factor causing the different outcome and my hypothesis would be incorrect. After comparing the nuclear programs of the two countries it was found that leverage was in fact different for the two countries, thus supporting my hypothesis.