

***Citizens United vs. FEC.* on the Political Policies of U.S. Senators**

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ABSTRACT

The increase in corporate political donations brought by *Citizens United vs. Federal Election Committee* (2010) has given businesses more power. Using regression analysis, I analyzed the proportions of PAC donations from businesses to incumbent senators re-elected in 2018 and 2020 in order to determine a relationship between contributions to senators and political ideology scores. Republicans were largely unaffected by the portion of business PAC donations they received, but Democratic senators who received a larger portion of PAC donations from businesses became more neutral than Democratic senators who did not receive such a high percentage of corporate PAC donations.

Introduction

During the landmark decision of *Citizens United vs. Federal Election Committee (FEC)*, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Citizens United, a political action committee (PAC). PACs cannot be officially affiliated with candidates, but the legal definition of affiliation with a political candidate is not strict, causing many PACs to benefit singular candidates. Similarly, political corruption is, legally, a quid pro quo where a candidate and third party receive something in exchange for one another. These definitions were developed during the *Citizens United* decision in 2010 when PACs became officially legal. Most political donations by corporations are inherently a quid pro quo, where one party receives something in exchange for money given to a political representative. This relationship is inherent in any situation where a political candidate has received money, or any other services, from them, but large donations made by corporations are still not seen as corruption. However, PACs do not need to disclose what their money is spent on but must show from where they received donations. Donors may also be made hidden through suspicious nonprofits that do not disclose their contributors.

A survey conducted by Cook et al. on 104 exceptionally wealthy Americans from the Chicago-metropolitan area found that “they vote, talk politics, campaign, and donate money to political causes at much higher rates than do average citizens,” and they “averaged a substantial \$4,600 in annual political contribution.”¹ This problem has negatively impacted almost all Americans because the wealthy have an undue advantage in affecting national policies and laws, including those made by senators. A possible cause of this problem is a lack of regulation on the undue political influence of corporations.

Corporations may also donate unlimited amounts of money to political candidates because of this landmark decision, as they can donate money to PACs that are not affiliated with candidates but can still help their campaigns. In an article from the Brennan Center for Justice, a nonprofit nongovernmental organization and political think tank that is associated with New York University, journalist Tim Lau found that “from 2010 to 2018, super PACs spent approximately \$2.9 billion on federal elections,” and “the bulk of that money comes from just a few wealthy individual

¹ Fay Lomax Cook, Benjamin I. Page, and Rachel L. Moskowitz, “Political Engagement by Wealthy Americans,” *Political Science Quarterly* 129, no. 3 (2014): 381-98. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43828434>, 396.

donors.”² Wealth, from individuals and corporations, has led to disproportionate political influence that has present and future repercussions. How do political donations from business PACs to American senators affect their political ideologies?

Literature Review

Wealth and economic inequality have affected political influence representation in the United States. Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright, through the comparison of two surveys done on exceptionally wealthy Americans and the general public, proved that the American wealthy have very different political opinions from the American public and may therefore be more effective in implementing their opinions in government.³ Fay Lomax Cook, Benjamin I. Page, and Rachel L. Moskowitz, using the same aforementioned surveys, clarify this understanding as political scientists by explaining how wealthy Americans, because of direct contact to representatives, have their opinions influence politicians.⁴ While the first article only shows that the wealthy are represented more and therefore disproportionately in the federal government, the latter explained these results by developing a causal model in which the wealthy are disproportionately represented because of their close connections to their representatives. While Page et al. and Cook et al. both conclude that additional campaign finance policies regarding individuals improve governmental efficiency, the question of regulating corporations remains.

While extremely wealthy individuals deeply impact the political system, major corporations do as well. As a political science professor, Susan Webb Yackee collected data on two methods of lobbying, invisible and visible, in Wisconsin to support her claim that both methods produce the greatest political change when used in tandem, but invisible lobbying alone has the greatest effect on the government. Therefore, there should be attempts to limit the influence of individuals and corporations who use invisible lobbying to push their political agendas. Visible lobbying is generally considered to be the socially acceptable method of political influence since it is often done through a display of a public reaction to the work done by a representative. Invisible lobbying is often done through professional lobbyists and large donations, which is generally frowned upon due to the high cost of lobbying and political contributions being available mostly to the wealthy. In her study, Yackee found that individuals who had more political connections and lobbying experience were more effective with invisible lobbying than the general public was with visible lobbying.⁵ Jürgen Huber and Michael Kirchler completed a regression analysis on the effect of political donations given to presidents by corporations and found that the proportion of money given to the winner and the total contribution had predictive power and that corporations did benefit from donating to presidential elections. While Yackee utilized an experimental approach from a political science perspective, Huber and Kirchler, as professors of finance, developed an economic model to examine the effect of invisible lobbying done by corporations.⁶ When used together, these articles demonstrate the problem of lack of regulation on corporate lobbying. A substantial body of research reveals the undue influence of corporations on political policies from different approaches.

The influence of wealthy individuals and corporations on the political system in the United States is likely to continue. Bonica et al. used previous literature on political economy in the America and its connection to inequality to explain why a democratic government has been unsuccessful in stopping the rising wealth gap, with the main

² Tim Lau, “Citizens United Explained,” Brennan Center for Justice, last modified December 12, 2019, accessed December 20, 2021, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/citizens-united-explained>.

³ Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright, “Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans,” *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 1 (March 2013): 51-73. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43280689>.

⁴ Cook et al., “Political Engagement by Wealthy Americans.”

⁵ Susan Webb Yackee, “Invisible (and Visible) Lobbying: The Case of State Regulatory Policymaking,” *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (2015): 322-44. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24643837>.

⁶ Jürgen Huber and Michael Kirchler, “Corporate Campaign Contributions and Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections,” *Public Choice* 156, no. 1/2 (2013): 285-307. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42003159>.

reasons being both political parties' acceptance of financial deregulation; rising real income and its subsequent effect of pushing enough people away from supporting welfare policies; the influence of the wealthy; and finally, political distortions caused by gerrymandering, lobbying, and filibusters. The authors contend that, despite economic fluctuations and the volatile effects of global markets on the American economy, the rise in inequality has been a purposeful act done by the political and wealthy elite. To fix this, the authors emphasize the significance of a continuous loop between public policy and inequality to fix this issue. As professors of political science, the authors primarily use theory to draw conclusions about patterns in the American political system and confirm them through historical examples.⁷ Similarly, Pfeffer and Schoeni, through the use of previous research, argue that economic inequality, as determined from birth, is highly influential in shaping the economic standings of people in their futures. They found that economic opportunity, in terms of education, assistance, generational wealth, and overall gaps in the political system such as unequal representation and economic growth, are the main concerns in the United States. Pfeffer, the founding director of the Center for Inequality Dynamics and the Co-Investigator of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics at the University of Michigan, and Schoeni, a Research Professor at the Institute for Social Research and Professor of Economics and Public Policy, stress the importance of qualitative data to encourage stronger public support of policies that would regulate any impact of financial status on the American political system.⁸ While both sources believe the influence of the wealthy on democracy must be removed, they discuss it in different ways. Bonica et al. review its effects on Americans and how this will change in the future without any change,⁹ while Pfeffer and Schoeni examine the issue more closely by identifying the main problems the country must address.¹⁰ To prevent the effects of current economic inequality and the undue influence of the wealthy and corporations from compounding, there must be campaign finance and transparency legislation to promote the highest social and economic welfare for all Americans.

A gap in the current body of knowledge regarding the effect of *Citizens United* on the American political system is that previous studies on this case have not specifically looked at the effect of donations on senatorial policies since the ruling in 2010. As a political scientist working for the nonprofit nongovernmental organization, OpenSecrets, Sheila Krumholz, used data from the Federal Election Commission (F.E.C.) and the Internal Revenue Service to prove that lobbying and the influx of private money in the American political system are causing corruption, affirming the findings of Zillante and Shapiro.¹¹ However, much of the existing literature on this topic used surveys and other forms of qualitative research to examine the effect of the decision on politics, which is different from my proposed method of regression analysis to determine a relationship between senators and donations made to PACs. Similarly, Shapiro and Zillante found that stricter contribution limits either improve or have no effect on voter welfare, but they found that full anonymity of donors led to the highest social welfare.¹² As economists, the authors used an experimental model to make a supported claim about the effects of transparency in national elections in the United States. Both sources, however, do certify that transparency is necessary to prevent the undue influence of the wealthy on the American political system, but they fail to consider how *Citizens United* affected senators' political ideologies, my topic of inquiry.

⁷ Adam Bonica et al., "Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27, no. 3 (2013): 103–23. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41955547>.

⁸ Fabian T. Pfeffer and Robert F. Schoeni, "How Wealth Inequality Shapes Our Future," *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 2, no. 6 (2016): 2–22. <https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2016.2.6.01>.

⁹ Bonica et al., "Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed."

¹⁰ Pfeffer and Schoeni, "How Wealth Inequality Shapes."

¹¹ Sheila Krumholz, "Campaign Cash and Corruption: Money in Politics, Post-Citizens United," *Social Research* 80, no. 4 (Winter 2013): 1119–34. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24385653>.

¹² Dmitry Shapiro, and Arthur Zillante, "Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment," *Southern Economic Journal* 84, no. 1 (2017): 98–119. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26632748>.

To fill this gap of knowledge, an analysis done on the policies set by *Citizens United* on the policies of senators is necessary. There is a problem with the unregulated influence of the wealthy. Perhaps a regression analysis that investigates the correlation between the money donated to a senator from a PAC and their political policies could remedy this situation.

Methodology

I performed a regression analysis of PAC donations to incumbent senators elected in 2020 and 2018 in order to determine a relationship between contributions to senators and political ideology scores. To discern the relationship between corporate campaign contributions to presidential candidates and the corporations' stock returns following the victory of the supported candidate, Huber and Kirchler also used the regression analysis method. Using data from presidential elections between 1992 and 2004, they "[explored] whether the total contributions of a company and the distribution of contributions to the winner and loser of an election were correlated with abnormal returns to its stocks."¹³ This study uses regression analysis in order to find a correlation and potential causation between two factors, a method that I replicated in my research. Before choosing to apply Huber and Kirchler's method, I sought to utilize the case study method, but I realized that this method would be more ineffective than a regression analysis when applying the results to similar elections in the United States.

First, I created a list of incumbent senators who won reelection in 2018 and 2020. Only incumbent senators were included in the data collection because all newly-elected and appointed senators would not have quantifiable political ideologies due to a lack of previous political office that may show their respective ideologies. Campaigns do not provide sufficient evidence for a measurable political ideology since these candidates have not shown their beliefs as a senator. Then, I used GovTrack, an independent political website that uses an objective statistical analysis method, Principal Components Analysis, to assign each member of Congress a score of their respective political ideology. GovTrack creates a 'Report Card' for all senators in office for each year, and I used each year's Report Card to collect data on each senator. Zero indicates the most left-leaning politicians while one represents the most right-leaning.¹⁴ I took the average GovTrack political ideology score, one score from each six-year term, of each member using the "Functions: AVERAGE" feature on Google Sheets. Only data from the 2018 and 2020 elections were used because GovTrack only provided ideological scores for senators after 2013, so the 2018 election was the first that could be used, given that each senatorial term is six years. The average GovTrack score was used to account for fluctuations in the political ideologies of each politician and to ensure that the score was in correlation with the correct factor, the proportion of donations given to a senator over a term from business-oriented PACs out of all donations given by PACs (clearly stated on each senator's OpenSecrets page).

In addition to collecting data from GovTrack, I used OpenSecrets to collect data on the percentage of PACs' contributions given by business PACs from each senator's specific subpage on OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets is a non-partisan, independent nonprofit and nongovernmental organization that uses research to "track the flow of money in American politics and provide the data and analysis to strengthen democracy."¹⁵ The organization collects data on donations given to senators and other politicians from the Federal Election Commission's website.

I found a correlation between the average GovTrack score of an incumbent senator's term and the portion of PAC contributions made by business-oriented PACs to determine a relationship between political ideology and donations from PACs.

¹³ Huber and Kirchler, "Corporate Campaign Contributions," 286.

¹⁴ "Analysis Methodology," GovTrack, accessed January 29, 2022, <https://www.govtrack.us/about/analysis#ideology>.

¹⁵ "Mission," OpenSecrets, accessed January 29, 2022, <https://www.opensecrets.org/about/>.

The aforementioned Huber and Kirchler questioned whether the proportion “given to the winner and total contribution [had] predictive power.”¹⁶ To follow this model, the proportion of donations was used as an independent variable. Should the actual donation amount have been used, it would have been impossible to discern whether a candidate received a small and equal amount of donations from all types of PACs or a large amount from only business PACs. This variable ensures that the donation data for all senators are used relative to each other. In addition, this factor also helps show a correlation between contributions from corporate PACs and political ideologies by ensuring that no other factors affecting the analysis, such as a senator’s popularity, are causing significant distortions.

My research question is in alignment with my method because I tested whether corporate political donations from PACs have affected senators’ policies. Regression analysis uses historical data to prove whether one variable has affected another, and the goal of my research question was to investigate the effects of one factor, political contributions from business PACs, on another variable, senators’ policies. This method is the best choice to investigate my research question since it looked at specific data sets from the past and showed a trend that can be utilized to make predictions.

Furthermore, I believe that this is the best method to use to show a correlation between the two stated factors. The use of historical data shows a consistent trend in both elections, and the results may have strong predictive power. Furthermore, regression analysis is meant to show a relationship between two variables, and the data collected shows a directly exponential correlation between the values for each election. However, the results must be considered in the context of other data and literature, as the correlation seen may not be an effect of causation on the independent variable, percentage of PAC donations from businesses, on the dependent variable, senators’ political ideologies in 2018 and 2020.

Results

I collected data on two elections, the 2018 and 2020 senatorial elections. The data included the percentage of PAC donations from businesses and the average ideology score during each senator’s six-year term. To analyze the results, I examined the data by election year and then specifically by political parties for each election year.

In 2018, 25 senators were re-elected into office. Of these senators, four were Republicans, two were independent, and 19 were Democrats (*see Table 1*). Using the “CORREL (correlation)” feature on Google Sheets, the correlation value between the two sets of data, the average GovTrack score from 2013 to 2018, and the percentage of PAC donations from businesses was 0.5097066568. When analyzing all of the collected data about the 2018 election, I found a positive exponential relationship (*see Graph 1*). However, when the data was analyzed by political parties, I found positive linear relationships for the Republican and Independent parties (*see Graph 2 and Graph 4*). The slope of the Independent Party line is steeper than the line of the Republican Party line. The Democratic Party line was a positive exponential curve (*see Graph 2*).

In 2020, 24 senators were re-elected into office. Fifteen were Republicans, and nine were Democrats (*see Graph 6 and Graph 7*). Using the “CORREL (correlation)” feature on Google Sheets, the correlation value between the two sets of data, the average GovTrack score from 2015 to 2020, and the percentage of PAC donations from businesses was 0.682345606. When the data for each party was combined, I found a positive exponential relationship for the 2020 election (*see Graph 5*). However, when the data was separated by political party, each party had a linear relationship; the Democratic Party had a positive linear relationship (*see Graph 6*), while the Republican Party had a negative linear relationship with a more gradual slope than that slope of the Democratic graph (*see Graph 7*). In the Republican graph, most of the data points were clustered in the top right corner, suggesting that a mathematical relationship may not apply to this subsection of data.

¹⁶ Huber and Kirchler, “Corporate Campaign Contributions,” 290.

Discussion

Over two elections, my results show trends in senatorial elections. Because the senators' past terms' scores were analyzed, I sought to realize a relationship in which polarity increased as senators expected a higher donation from business PACs. I originally hypothesized that as business PAC donations increased, political polarity would also increase, but this was proven false in each election.

Using the "CORREL (correlation) feature on Google Sheets, the correlation values for 2018 and 2020, 0.5097066568 and 0.682345606, respectively, show that there is a positive relationship between the two tested variables, but the medium magnitudes show that it is not very strong.

In both the 2018 and 2020 elections, the Democratic Party displays a positive relationship in which as the portion of PAC donations from businesses increased, so did the political ideology score of a senator. Based on the meaning of the score (closer to zero is more left-leaning and closer to one is more right-leaning), these graphs show that as donations increase, Democratic senators became more neutral, rather than left-leaning (*see Graph 2 and Graph 6*). This suggests that these donations from businesses were meant to prevent senators from enacting policies that may disturb businesses' operations or practices. Many corporations and businesses are under-regulated or have additional taxes, policies that are usually supported by Republicans and not Democrats. A lack of regulation on businesses is generally considered to be a more right-leaning policy. The donations, as a result, may be used as a tool to push senators to become 'pro-business.' This is shown to be especially true in the case of extremely left-leaning Democrats, such as Jeff Merkley in the 2020 election, who had an average GovTrack score of 0.07, and only 27.58 percent of his PAC donations were from businesses (*see Table 2*). However, Merkely's data exhibits a larger trend in the 2020 election, which showed a linear relationship in contrast with an exponential increase, as in 2018 (*see Graph 2 and Graph 6*). Given the more tense and polar political climate surrounding the 2020 election, Democrats up for re-election likely wanted to distinguish themselves from their proven pro-business counterparts, Republicans, by rejecting many corporate PAC donations to prove their left-leaning policies.

On the other hand, the Republican Party showed almost no relationship between the two tested variables. In both elections, as business PAC donations increased, ideology scores remained clustered around 0.75, a moderate right-leaning score, showing neither centrism nor extremism (*see Graph 3 and Graph 7*). The lack of connection between the variables in both cases suggests that Republicans, as a generally pro-business party, did not need much variation in corporate PAC donations because they always received a uniform percentage. Additionally, the American public generally expects this pattern of corporate influence on the G.O.P. While there is a slightly higher variation in the portion of PAC donations from businesses in the 2020 election, this was likely caused by the number of data points in 2020 being higher than the number in 2018 (*see Table 2*).

In both instances, the parties exhibit dissimilar trends: while the Democratic Party becomes more centrist as a result of corporate PAC donations, the ideological scores of the Republican Party remain unaffected by business PAC donations. These tendencies are the result of existing beliefs and political perceptions of each respective party, but only the Democratic Party shows an inclination to change its campaign financing practices depending on the context and goals of each election, in contrast to the consistent trends shown by the G.O.P in both 2018 and 2020.

Implications

These results will be helpful to the political science community, especially politicians and political analysts. Because my results show that donations from business PACs may affect senators' ideologies, they show the importance of implementing and enforcing campaign finance laws that will ensure there is no outside influence on American elections. Due to *Citizens United*, PACs are able to collect and spend unlimited amounts of money on candidates that they

are not officially supporting.¹⁷ This may result in a large number of donations from suspicious sources being given to candidates, as PACs have the potential to act as ‘tunnels’ for ‘dark money.’ The election cycles that were analyzed were after the decision, which occurred in 2010, so they may show the potential effects of dark money on politicians’ ideologies and practices.

When viewing each election as a whole, the exponential relationship shows that the effect of business PAC donations becomes smaller as the senators’ political ideology scores increase. Since lower scores are more left-leaning, the Democratic Party is more affected by changes in the proportion of PAC donations from businesses than the Republican Party is. In this sense, the correlation value and trendline for the party show the importance of PACs to the party as a whole. While the Republican Party showed a consistent cluster (and therefore no discernable relationship between political ideology and business PAC donations), the Democrats did. As a result, outside money, some of which may come from suspicious sources, could affect the practices and beliefs of this party more than they affect the G.O.P. Therefore, the Democratic Party, in comparison to the Republican Party, shows a bigger susceptibility to potentially hazardous business PAC donations.

Limitations

Since I collected secondary data, there were limitations when concluding my results. Because I used calculated political ideology scores from GovTrack, I could only collect data from 2013 and onward. As a result, the only two elections I could analyze were in 2018 and 2020 since I needed the average political score of the senators’ previous six-year terms. In addition, I could only use re-elected senators in 2018 and 2020 because I needed to know their ideological scores from their most recent term, and newly-elected politicians would not fulfill these requirements. As a result, I did not have as many data points to identify a strongly supported conclusion and could not identify any specific effects of *Citizens United*, which happened in 2010. During the 2018 election, there were only four re-elected Republican candidates, making it difficult to realize a strong pattern over the two elections. Similarly, there were only two data points for senators who belonged to Independent parties over both cycles, which led to data points that did not contribute to a significant trend line.

The inherent limitation of the regression analysis method is that the data will prove an erroneous relationship or produce incorrect or misleading assumptions. While the trend line may be accurate to the graphical data and has a strong correlation value, there may be no connection between the factors. As a result, in order to ensure that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between PAC donations from businesses and political ideology, outside data is necessary.

Additional limitations include the disproportionate voting bodies of each senator. Unlike members of the House of Representatives who have roughly equal voting districts, the standard number of senators per state limits the availability of PAC donors to each senator. Additionally, migrations that have yet to be accounted for in the national census and the introduction of mail-in voting may also limit the accuracy of my findings.

Conclusion

Extreme unequal distribution of affluence has led to unequal political representation, where businesses and wealthy individuals have extra influence, but campaign finance policies are meant to fix this. *Citizens United* (2010) has led to an increase in political donations and will likely give corporations more power. I performed a regression analysis of PAC donations to incumbent senators elected in 2020 and 2018 in order to determine a relationship between contributions to senators and political ideology scores. As Democratic senators received a larger portion of PAC donations

¹⁷ Lau, “Citizens United,” Brennan Center for Justice.

from businesses, they became more neutral. Republicans are largely unaffected by the portion of business PAC donations they receive. Because Democrats are generally not supposed to be ‘pro-business,’ they become more right-leaning when they receive more donations from businesses. Since Republicans are expected to be pro-business, their political ideologies are not largely affected by any proportion of donations they receive.

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Appendix


Table 1. 2018 Election.

Political Party	Re-elected Incumbent Senator in 2018	Portion of PAC Donation from Businesses ¹⁸	Average GovTrack Score (2013-2018)	GovTrack Score by Year ¹⁹					
				2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
D	Elizabeth Warren	45.64	0.07333333333	0.15	0.23	0	0	0.03	0.03
D	Tammy Baldwin	50.09	0.175	0.26	0.28	0.14	0.07	0.14	0.16
D	Sheldon Whitehouse	50.95	0.09833333333	0.18	0.19	0.12	0.07	0.02	0.01
D	Bob Menendez	57.64	0.1733333333	0.23	0.26	0.18	0.19	0.09	0.09
D	Mazie Hirono	58.77	0.1266666667	0.13	0.18	0.13	0.11	0.1	0.11
D	Kirsten Gillibrand	60.22	0.06166666667	0	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.07
D	Maria Cantwell	64.24	0.2466666667	0.29	0.34	0.29	0.25	0.16	0.15
D	Sherrod Brown	70.82	0.1266666667	0.12	0.17	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.15
D	Amy Klobuchar	70.83	0.2666666667	0.32	0.38	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.18
D	Martin Heinrich	72.74	0.2516666667	0.32	0.34	0.26	0.24	0.16	0.19
D	Jon Tester	73.23	0.4133333333	0.56	0.57	0.43	0.4	0.3	0.22
D	Joe Manchin	73.45	0.6	0.71	0.72	0.62	0.57	0.52	0.46
D	Tim Kaine	73.61	0.3033333333	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.27	0.38
D	Chris Murphy	74.82	0.1533333333	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.12	0.11
D	Debbie Stabenow	77.14	0.2016666667	0.28	0.31	0.2	0.15	0.13	0.14
D	Ben Cardin	78.11	0.1966666667	0.23	0.28	0.22	0.23	0.12	0.1
D	Dianne Feinstein	78.37	0.1533333333	0.16	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.16
D	Bob Casey Jr.	74.58	0.28	0.32	0.33	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.23
D	Tom Carper	78.11	0.3266666667	0.25	0.29	0.39	0.42	0.29	0.32
I	Bernie Sanders	5.52	0.04333333333	0.01	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07
I	Angus King	70.64	0.4183333333	0.53	0.51	0.43	0.41	0.33	0.3
R	Ted Cruz	72.45	0.8866666667	0.94	0.96	0.92	0.92	0.81	0.77
R	Roger Wicker	77.13	0.85	0.9	0.91	0.8	0.86	0.81	0.82
R	Deb Fischer	78.54	0.8816666667	0.89	0.89	0.88	0.91	0.86	0.86
R	John Barrasso	87.3	0.9166666667	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.94	0.89	0.91

¹⁸ "Members of Congress," GovTrack, accessed March 20, 2022, <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members>.


¹⁹ "Congress," OpenSecrets, accessed March 20, 2022, <https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress>.

Average GovTrack Score (2013-2018) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for All Re-Elected Senators in 2018




Graph 1.

Average GovTrack Score (2013-2018) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for Re-Elected Democrats in 2018




Graph 2.

Average GovTrack Score (2013-2018) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for Re-Elected Republicans in 2018



Graph 3.

Average GovTrack Score (2013-2018) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for Re-Elected Independents in 2013



Graph 4.


Table 2. 2020 Election.

Political Party	Re-elected Incumbent Senator in 2020	Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses ²⁰	Average GovTrack Score (2015-2020)	GovTrack Score by Year ²¹					
				2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015
R	James Risch	70.16	0.8983333333	0.83	0.89	0.91	0.91	0.9	0.95
R	Dan Sullivan	71.46	0.745	0.71	0.71	0.76	0.8	0.73	0.76
R	Tom Cotton	71.5	0.925	0.93	0.9	0.97	0.98	0.87	0.9
R	Lindsey Graham	74.04	0.7166666667	0.69	0.7	0.74	0.76	0.69	0.72
R	James M. Inhofe	75.76	0.9733333333	0.93	0.91	1	1	1	1
R	Mike Rounds	76.28	0.895	0.88	0.88	0.97	0.97	0.84	0.83
R	Joni Ernst	76.66	0.88	0.92	0.96	0.93	0.87	0.78	0.82
R	Steven Daines	76.95	0.8833333333	0.86	0.84	0.92	0.89	0.86	0.93
R	Susan Collins	77.23	0.5166666667	0.61	0.56	0.54	0.51	0.43	0.45
R	Ben Sasse	79.32	0.7616666667	0.76	0.74	0.78	0.74	0.79	0.76
R	Shelley Moore Capito	79.65	0.765	0.76	0.74	0.76	0.78	0.75	0.8
R	Bill Cassidy	82.17	0.8116666667	0.8	0.76	0.83	0.82	0.83	0.83
R	Mitch McConnell	83.9	0.7466666667	0.7	0.64	0.77	0.76	0.79	0.82
R	Thom Tillis	84.53	0.8566666667	0.91	0.86	0.88	0.9	0.78	0.81
R	John Cornyn	85.4	0.9083333333	0.9	0.9	0.96	0.95	0.85	0.89
D	Jeff Merkley	27.58	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.09
D	Cory Booker	41.94	0.1666666667	0.09	0.07	0.17	0.21	0.24	0.22
D	Ed Markey	48.1	0.0733333333	0.1	0.1	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.03
D	Jack Reed	64.09	0.125	0.18	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.07
D	Jeanne Shaheen	66.17	0.3066666667	0.36	0.34	0.32	0.34	0.26	0.22
D	Gary Peters	70.72	0.3683333333	0.46	0.42	0.44	0.44	0.26	0.19
D	Dick Durbin	73.72	0.1316666667	0.19	0.15	0.14	0.17	0.07	0.07
D	Chris Coons	76.85	0.3716666667	0.42	0.44	0.42	0.39	0.28	0.28
D	Mark Warner	82.48	0.445	0.4	0.4	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47

²⁰ “Members of Congress,” GovTrack.


²¹ “Congress,” OpenSecrets.

Average GovTrack Score (2015-2020) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for All Re-Elected Senators in 2020




Graph 5.

Average GovTrack Score (2015-2020) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for Re-Elected Democrats in 2020



Graph 6.

Average GovTrack Score (2015-2020) vs. Percentage of PAC Donations from Businesses for Re-Elected Republicans in 2020



Graph 7.